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PARENTAL ENTITLEMENT AND 
CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
JAMES G. DWYER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporal punishment is conduct distinguished legally from generic assault 
and battery by its context and purpose—namely, its use by one person having 
authority over another for the purpose of improving the latter’s behavior and 
character. With respect to context, public debate concerning corporal 
punishment in recent decades has been limited to the situation of parents’ or 
their agents’ (principally school teachers) using it on children. Indeed, 
opponents of corporal punishment often point to the settled, widespread 
conviction that it is never appropriate for adults in a position of authority over 
other adults to hit the latter for purposes of correction.1 With respect to 
purpose, although there are worries that parents will strike children with illicit 
purpose or with no purpose if given permission to strike them at all,2 the core 
issue in the corporal punishment debate is whether striking children for the 
purpose of correction is permissible. Because of corporal punishment’s specific 
context and purpose, pertinent political and public debate typically focuses on 
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 1. See, e.g., 114 PARL. DEB., S. 39th Parl., 2d Sess. 1400 (2007) (statement of Hon. Hervieux-
Payette), available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/39/2/parlbus/chambus/senate/deb-e/011db_2007-11-14-
e.htm?Language=E&Parl= 39&Ses=2#69 [hereinafter Canadian PARL. DEB.] (describing corporal 
punishment as “a practice that is outdated, barbaric, and discriminatory towards our children”); Susan 
H. Bitensky, The Poverty of Precedent for School Corporal Punishment’s Constitutionality Under the 
Eighth Amendment, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 1327, 1332–33 (2009) (finding “tremendous cause for concern 
from the standpoint of human suffering and child endangerment”); Peter Munro, Smack the Child, Go 
to Jail: Parents Pressured, SUN HERALD (Sydney), Aug. 23, 2009, at 14 (noting comment by a 
proponent of legislation to ban corporal punishment that “children here are the only people against 
whom violence is sanctioned and justified as discipline”). 
 2. See, e.g., Peter Gelzinis, Spanking Law Won’t Hit Where It Really Hurts, BOSTON HERALD, 
Nov. 28, 2007, at 8 (relating comments by sponsor of bill to ban corporal punishment suggesting that 
the ban would reduce the incidence of excessive parental violence against children); Munro, supra note 
1 (relating comment by public official in Australia that “anything that a parent does out of frustration 
or temper is absolutely wrong, but we should be able to decipher between what is child abuse and what 
is not”); Carolyn Norton, Move on to Ban School Paddling, HERALD-SUN (Durham, N.C.), Mar. 15, 
2007, at A1 (reporting that state legislator introduced bill to ban paddling in public schools “after 
hearing about a Robeson County case where a twelve-year-old boy was so severely bruised by a 
teacher’s spanking that he was taken to the emergency room”). 
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whether and to what extent child rearing differs from other contexts in which 
one person might wish to change the behavior and attitudes of another.  
Child rearing might be unique in terms of its empirical features, such as the 
nature of children’s minds or the motivations and dispositions of parents in 
controlling their children. Those features might support a claim that corporal 
punishment is uniquely effective with children, necessary with children, or not 
harmful to children. Empirical arguments concerning the needs and welfare of 
children have in fact dominated debate concerning corporal punishment. 
Supporters of a ban contend that corporal punishment is not effective or at least 
not necessary, that it inflicts psychological damage on children, that it 
undermines children’s trust in parents, that it encourages children to use 
violence, and that parents often hit children with improper motivation and 
disposition.3 Opponents of a ban contend that corporal punishment is necessary 
or especially effective, at least with some children; they deny that spanking or 
paddling is psychologically damaging, often citing their own personal 
 
 3. See, e.g., Canadian Found. for Children, Youth & the Law v. Canada, [2004] S.C.R. 4, 116–17 
(Can.) (Deschamps, J., dissenting) (“The government’s explicit choice not to criminalize some assaults 
against children violates their dignity.”); H.R. 3922, 185th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ma. 2007) (stating that 
reasons for a bill to prohibit corporal punishment included “the emotional harm and risks of bodily 
harm associated with corporal punishment”); Canadian PARL. DEB., supra note 1, at 1520–30; 
COUNCIL OF EUROPE, ABOLISHING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT OF CHILDREN 9 (2007), http:// 
www.coe.int/t/transversalprojects/children/pdf/QuestionAnswer_en.pdf (noting that corporal 
punishment violates children’s human rights, causes physical and psychological harm, encourages 
violence as a solution to conflict, and is an ineffective disciplinary measure); Susan H. Bitensky, Spare 
the Rod, Embrace Human Rights: International Law’s Mandate Against All Corporal Punishment of 
Children, 21 WHITTIER L. REV. 147 passim (1999); Elizabeth T. Gershoff, More Harm Than Good: A 
Summary of Scientific Research on the Intended and Unintended Effects of Corporal Punishment on 
Children, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31, 54-56 (Spring 2010) (concluding that corporal punishment is 
no more effective than other disciplinary methods and that “the risk for harm . . . far outweighs any 
short-term good”); Elizabeth T. Gershoff & Susan H. Bitensky, The Case Against Corporal Punishment 
of Children, 13 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 231, 236–37 (2007) (disputing the hypothesis that there 
might be a “genetic basis for the association of parental corporal punishment with child behavior 
problems”); Brandee Hayhurst, Bill May Expel Corporal Punishment, TIMES-NEWS (Burlington, N.C.), 
Mar. 23, 2007, available at http://www.thetimesnews.com/news/school-85-punishment-corporal.html 
(citing an advocate for children who argued for a ban on the grounds that “spanking is ineffective 
compared to discipline programs that teach children positive behavior” and that it is hypocritical to 
“take a piece of wood and hit it upside a child’s backside for things like fighting or being violent”); 
Keith Howard, Spanking Ban Debate Brings Attention to Issue, LOWELL SUN (Mass.), Nov. 29, 2007, 
available at NewsBank, File No. 7590380 (citing supporter of spanking ban as asserting that corporal 
punishment does not work, but rather just induces more misbehavior); Mandy Locke, UNC Study 
Links Spankers to Abusers, NEWS & OBSERVER (Raleigh, N.C.), August 19, 2008, at B1 (discussing a 
study showing that parents who spank children with an object are nine times more likely to abuse the 
children through more severe means, and quoting a child advocate as saying a result of spanking is that 
the “relationship of trust is broken”); Munro, supra note 1 (citing studies linking corporal punishment 
with “increased child aggression and delinquency, and increased adult criminal and antisocial 
behavior”); Laurel J. Sweet, Bay State Going Slap-Happy; House to Debate Ban on Spanking, BOSTON 
HERALD, Nov. 27, 2009, at 2 (quoting Swedish embassy official as saying, “There are other ways and 
means to bring up children than to beat them . . . . Much better ways.”). Critics of corporal punishment 
in schools also complain that it is administered in a discriminatory fashion, with minority and disabled 
students disproportionately suffering paddlings. See, e.g., Sam Dillon, Disabled Students Are Spanked 
More, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, at A10. 
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experience to make both empirical points; and they assert that the state 
interference in family life a ban would entail would itself be harmful to 
children.4 
In addition to its empirical features, corporal punishment of children might 
be unique in terms of its normative features—in particular, in terms of the 
persons involved having rights or duties unique to the child-rearing context. 
Arguments against corporal punishment generally rely on a normative premise 
denying this uniqueness. The premise is that children possess the same moral 
rights adults are thought to possess, even as against their parents, and that some 
of those rights preclude corporal punishment—namely, a right not to be hit or, 
more generally, a right against attacks on dignity or bodily integrity.5 
 
 4. See, e.g., Canadian Found., S.C.R. at 40–46, 64–66 (Binnie, J.) (“Parliament could reasonably 
conclude that the intervention of the police or criminal courts in a child’s home in respect of 
‘reasonable’ correction would inhibit rather than encourage the resolution of problems within 
families.”); Christian Educ. S. Africa v. Minister of Educ. 2000 (4) SA 757 (CC) at 804 (S. Afr.) 
(reciting argument of religious school organization that “physical punishment only became degrading 
when it passed a certain degree of severity”); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 3, at 33 (noting that 
personal experience makes it difficult for many supporters of corporal punishment to change their 
minds, because “[n]one of us likes to think badly of our parents, or of our own parenting”); Robert E. 
Larzelere & Diana Baumrind, Are Spanking Injunctions Scientifically Supported?, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 57, 86 (Spring 2010) (“[S]ome parents are at risk for extremely permissive parenting 
or for increased verbal hostility when they are prohibited from using spanking or equally effective 
back-up tactics.”); Deana A. Pollard, Banning Corporal Punishment: A Constitutional Analysis, 52 AM. 
U. L. REV. 447, 481 (2002) (noting that state statutes authorizing corporal punishment of children 
“generally contain express legislative findings . . . regarding discipline and the parents’ need to train and 
educate their children”); Dillon, supra note 3 (quoting one school principal as saying that paddling is 
necessary when other means fail and another as saying “I was whipped as a child, so it’s fine with me.”); 
Kelli Hernandez, Is Corporal Punishment on the Outs?: School Board to Address Issue Monday, 
NORTHWEST FLA. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 11, 2009, available at http:// 
www.nwfdailynews.com/news/punishment-16620-corporal-school.html (quoting lobbyist for corporal 
punishment ban: “You always have those legislators that will say, ‘I got it, I deserved it and I turned out 
fine.’”); Rachelle Kliger, A Painful Education in the Middle East, YEMEN TIMES, May 18, 2009, 
available at NewsBank, File No. a0d2d5de78f4a2fdd7b519aa9235a7be0789b57 (reporting statements by 
teachers in middle-eastern countries that if they are not permitted to hit pupils, academic achievement 
will decline); Munro, supra note 1 (citing 2006 survey in Australia finding that sixty-nine percent of 
respondents “thought it sometimes necessary to ‘smack a naughty child’”); Norton, supra note 2 
(quoting school superintendent who defended paddling a misbehaving pupil as sometimes “the only 
way to affect his behavior”); Lesley Thomas, Why Smacking Is a Hit Again, DAILY TELEGRAPH 
(London), Feb. 21, 2008, available at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/ features/3635705/Why-
smacking-is-a-hit-again.html (quoting contributors to mumsnet.com asserting that smacking is effective 
and sometimes the only effective way to manage children); Tracy Sabo & Vivienne Foley, More than 
200,000 Kids Spanked at School, CNN.COM/US, http:// www.cnn.com/2008/US/08/20/ 
corporal.punishment/index.html (quoting James Dobson of Focus on the Family as saying “we have 
systematically eliminated the tools with which teachers have traditionally backed up their word. We’re 
now down to a precious few” and a school superintendent as saying “It works on some . . . .”). Some 
opponents also raise the specter of police arresting parents and throwing them in jail for slight physical 
restrictions on children, such as putting on a child’s seat belt, see Canadian PARL. DEB., supra note 1, at 
1530–40, but the very ludicrousness of that concern is suggestive of how weak a justification based on a 
parental entitlement to hit children is viewed to be.  
 5. See, e.g., Canadian Found., S.C.R. at 62, 64 (Binnie, J.), 112–15, 117 (Deschamps, J., dissenting) 
(finding that corporal punishment infringes children’s dignity and makes them into second-class 
citizens); X, Y and Z v. Sweden, App. No. 8811/79, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 147, 156 (1982) 
(observing that the Swedish criminal law of assault as applied to children “is intended to protect 
DWYER 10/12/2010  11:46:28 AM 
192 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 73:189 
In popular discourse, normative arguments against a legal prohibition on 
parents’ using corporal punishment with children sometimes rest on a general 
moral condemnation of state intrusion into family life.6 That complaint, 
however, is hardly specific to child rearing; the same argument was made 
against state intervention to prevent husbands from hitting their wives for the 
purpose of behavior modification.7 And it clearly goes too far, insofar as it 
would seem to rule out any laws against child abuse and neglect, even though 
everyone recognizes there must be some such laws. 
One normative contention one might expect to dominate defenses of 
corporal punishment, insofar as it does ostensibly differentiate child rearing 
from other contexts, is that parents possess special rights—that is, that corporal 
punishment must be allowed because parents are morally entitled to deal with 
their children as they wish, absent clear and substantial harm. Yet that sort of 
parental-entitlement-based claim, though once common and certainly 
sometimes still expressed, is not especially prominent in debates concerning 
corporal punishment today.8 Moreover, when defenders of corporal punishment 
 
potentially weak and vulnerable members of society”); Christian Educ. S. Africa, supra note 4, at 8–9 
(summarizing South African Minister of Education’s claim that corporal punishment of children 
violates their constitutional rights); H.R. 3922, 185th Leg., 1st Spec. Sess. (Ma. 2007); COUNCIL OF 
EUROPE, supra note 3, at 5 (“Children have the same rights as adults to respect for their human dignity 
and physical integrity.”); Quebec Commission des droits de la personne et des droits de la jeunesse, 
Corporal Punishment as a Means of Correcting Children 8 (1998) (“Corporal punishment violates the 
child’s dignity, partly due to the humiliation he or she is likely to feel, but mainly due to the lack of 
respect inherent in the act.”); Bitensky, supra note 3, passim; Munro, supra note 1 (noting pressure on 
Australia from the U.N. Commission on Children’s Rights). 
 6. See, e.g., Gelzinis, supra note 2 (opining that the “spare-the-rod-spoil-the-child, government-
out-of-my-life crowd is sure to be in full froth” when the Massachusetts legislature considered a bill to 
prohibit spanking); Howard, supra note 3 (quoting a state legislator opposed to a bill that would ban 
spanking as saying “I just don’t think it’s something for the state to get into”); Thomas Hammarberg, 
Europe Is Moving Towards a Total Ban on Domestic Violence Against Children, COUNCIL OF EUROPE, 
http://www.coe.int/ t/commissioner/Viewpoints/080121_en.asp (last visited Oct.20, 2009) (noting 
“widespread opinion that relation inside the family are no matter for outsiders”). 
 7. See Meghan E.B. Norton, The Adulterous Wife: A Cross-historical and Interdisciplinary 
Approach, 16 BUFF. WOMEN’S L.J. 1 passim (2008) (discussing historical attitudes toward husbands’ 
use of violence to discipline wives in the Anglo American legal tradition); Katerina Shaw, Barriers to 
Freedom: Continued Failure of U.S. Immigration Laws to Offer Equal Protection to Immigrant Battered 
Women, 15 CARDOZO J. L. & GENDER 663, 686 (2009) (discussing attitudes today among certain Asian 
and Middle Eastern immigrant groups in the United States); Sweet, supra note 3 (quoting a man who 
had been charged with assault for hitting his child with a belt as saying, “Are they going to start 
legislating that you can’t raise your voice to your kids? That you can’t tell them when to go to bed? 
We’ll be communists then.”). 
 8. Cf. Canadian Found., S.C.R. at 118–19 (Deschamps, J., dissenting) (observing that the majority 
had stipulated that the purpose of Ontario’s authorization of corporal punishment was “to protect 
children and families from the intrusion of the criminal law” when in fact its purpose when enacted was 
to serve notions of parental entitlement resting on “traditional notions of children as property”); 
Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 3, at 246 (noting dramatic change in the legal environment governing 
corporal punishment in the past thirty years, with more than half of U.S. states passing laws to ban it in 
schools, as well as change in the social-science community, with “many national professional 
organizations” calling for a ban); id. at 249 (noting that twenty-three countries have passed laws in 
recent decades banning corporal punishment in the home); id. at 253 (describing substantial increases 
in parental concern to protect children from harm and parental willingness to accept advice on child 
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do invoke parental rights, they typically do so in a limited way—one carefully 
tied to assertions about children’s needs or parents’ superior ability to 
determine what disciplinary action a particular child needs in a particular 
situation.9 Even when the claim is bolstered with an invocation of religious 
conviction, it is typically not that some religion prescribes a different way of life 
in which hitting has special meaning, but rather that adherents respect the 
wisdom of religious authority about how best to instill a sense of discipline in 
children.10 In addition, one is as likely to encounter claims that parents have a 
duty to use corporal punishment as one is to encounter claims that parents are 
entitled to use corporal punishment on children.11 
This treatment of parents’ normative status differs from that in other child-
rearing contexts, such as parental opposition to regulation of religious schooling 
and parental freedom to circumcise boys. Examining that difference might 
illuminate distinctive features of corporal punishment relative to other child-
rearing controversies. One aim of this article is therefore to examine the role 
that parental-entitlement claims play in debates about corporal punishment of 
children and to explain why they are less prominent and less grandiose than in 
certain other contexts. In addition, this article explains why parental 
 
rearing from outsiders); Spare the Rod, Say Some, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2008, (“[A] consensus against 
hitting children is clearly gathering momentum in the developed, law-governed parts of the world. . . . 
Some parents may still insist that their right to dissuade a toddler from doing very dangerous things is 
also worth protecting; but they are losing the argument.”). 
 9. See, e.g., X, Y and Z, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 148, 150 (summarizing argument that 
a ban on corporal punishment restricts parents’ freedom of conscience); Anti-corporal Punishment Bill: 
Hearing on A.B. 755 Before the Assembly Committee on Public Safety, 2009 Leg., 2007–2008 Sess. 5 
(Ca. 2007) (explaining the Attorney General’s position that the lawfulness of corporal punishment 
depends on necessity and reasonableness under the circumstances); COUNCIL OF EUROPE, supra note 
3, at 13 (responding to the argument made by the legislator quoted in Gelzinis’ article); Gelzinis, supra 
note 2 (quoting legislator who sponsored bill to ban spanking as saying, “[E]very parent is convinced 
they know how to do it just right, and it’s none of anybody else’s damn business—least of all the 
state[’s].”). 
 10. See, e.g., Christian Educ. S. Africa v. Minister of Educ. (4) SA 757 (CC) (S. Afr.), supra note 4, 
slip op. at 3–4, http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZACC/2000/11.html (setting forth biblical texts cited by 
plaintiff, which connect corporal punishment with teaching discipline); David E. Pratte, Is it Unloving 
to Spank Our Children?, THE GOSPEL WAY, http://www.gospelway.com/topics/family/spanking.php 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (“So God Himself uses chastening as an act of love. Are we wiser than 
God?”). 
 11. See, e.g., Hun Yin Fa [Marriage Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Sept. 10, 1980, effective Jan. 1, 1981) 2000 Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong. Gaz. art. 23 
(P.R.C.) (“Parents shall have the right and duty to subject their children who are minors to discipline . . 
. .”); Ronald L. Pitzer, Parental Attitudes and Beliefs Regarding Punishment as a Means of Child 
Discipline, CHILDREN, YOUTH & FAMILY CONSORTIUM, http://www.cyfc.umn.edu/family/resources/ 
GB1018.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (describing “a normative expectation in American society that 
parents will use physical punishment with their children”); Ryan Wolf, “Spanking Judge” Punished by 
State Commission on Judicial Conduct, VALLEYCENTRAL.COM, http://www.valleycentral.com/news/ 
news_story.aspx?id=281247 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (discussing warning given to judge who ordered 
parents of truants either to pay a fine or paddle their child in the courtroom); How to Spank Your 
Child in a Loving and Nurturing Manner, http:// motherfac.blogspot.com/2007/01/how-to-spank-your-
child-in-loving-and.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (“It is a parent’s right—no, it is the parent’s duty to 
spank her child when she needs it.”). 
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entitlement should in fact not play any role in these debates and why any 
normative claims should instead be couched solely in terms of children’s rights. 
That conclusion as to the proper scope of parental-rights claims does not dictate 
a particular policy outcome, for it is possible to make plausible arguments for or 
against corporal punishment in terms of children’s rights, depending on what 
empirical assumptions one makes. But adhering to proper limits on normative 
claims can help to clarify whether and to what extent particular empirical issues 
are crucial to the policy analysis. 
II 
TYPES OF PARENTAL-RIGHTS CLAIMS 
Having a right is conceptually different from merely being permitted to do 
something. One might happen to be legally free to do many things that the state 
arguably could, if it wished, prohibit one from doing. Driving down particular 
streets or at a particular speed is an example; that the law permits it does not 
mean that one has an entitlement to do it. Having a right is also different from 
possessing power or authority to take certain actions. The law gives attorneys 
authority to represent other persons in court without ascribing to them a right 
to do so. Teachers are empowered or authorized to discipline children, but we 
do not ordinarily say they have a right to do so; we say, rather, that they are 
permitted to do so. To have a right means to have an entitlement for one’s own 
sake that one can assert to prevent others from taking away or withholding 
something from one, or from interfering with one’s actions. And a right entails 
others’ owing duties to the right holder. Thus, a claim of parental entitlement 
goes beyond saying that it would be an innocuous or good thing to permit, 
empower, or authorize parents to do certain things: it rather asserts that it 
would be wrong for the state to prohibit or interfere with parents’ doing certain 
things and that the wrong would be a breach of duties owed to parents.  
Substantively, parents’ rights claims comprise two categories—possession 
rights and control rights. Possession rights are claims to a legal relationship with 
and custody of a child, whereas control rights are claims to power and freedom 
in child rearing once a parent–child custodial relationship is established.12 A 
right to engage in corporal punishment is within the latter category. Other 
common claims to power and freedom in child rearing arise in medical and 
education contexts; parents sometimes object to state-imposed requirements for 
 
 12. The former are reflected in the line of Supreme Court cases from Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 
645 (1972) to Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), addressing the rights of unwed biological 
fathers to become legal parents. The latter are reflected in Supreme Court decisions addressing parents’ 
rights to control their children’s education, such as Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), to be 
exempt from child-labor laws, Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), and to decide whether and 
when children will spend time with third parties such as grandparents, Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 
(2000). 
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care of children’s bodies, and parents sometimes object to state-prescribed 
curricula in public or private schools.13 
In addition to varying by subject matter, claims to parental-control rights 
vary in terms of their moral basis—specifically, in terms of whose interests the 
rights are said to protect. Ordinarily, individuals’ rights are understood to 
protect just their own interests (including their interests in having their choices 
be effective, whether the choices are on the whole good for them or not).14 If I 
have a right and the state violates it, the state has done a wrong to me, and it is 
hard to make sense of the state’s having wronged me except in terms of my 
interests. However, it is a peculiarity of parents’ rights discourse that they are 
often justified not (only) on the basis of parents’ own interests, but also or 
alternatively on the basis of children’s interests or the interests of society 
generally. Thus, one finds arguments that parents should have control rights 
because this is best for children or because this promotes certain societal aims 
such as cultural diversity, as well as arguments that parents should have control 
rights for the sake of their own preference satisfaction, perhaps as 
compensation for their child-rearing efforts and sacrifices.15 Part III below 
returns to this peculiarity and suggests that it makes most parents’ rights 
discourse incoherent and misguided. The present focus, though, is on the 
specific content of parents’ rights claims in different contexts, which does not 
appear to be much influenced by any widespread sense of when such claims are 
coherent and apt and when they are not. 
Examining the particular content of parental-entitlement claims in the 
corporal-punishment context and contrasting it with the content of such claims 
in other contexts might reveal why they are less prominent in the one context 
than in others. Doing so might reveal, too, something about the relative 
inherent strength or appropriateness of such claims in the corporal-punishment 
context and so clarify which empirical issues are crucial to assessing the validity 
of parental-rights claims in this context. The analysis below uses as points of 
contrast parent–state conflicts over regulation of religious schools and debates 
 
 13. See Douglas County v. Anaya, 694 N.W.2d 601 (Neb. 2005) (rejecting parental religious 
objection to a newborn-metabolic-screening mandate); JAMES G. DWYER, RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. 
CHILDREN’S RIGHTS 45 (Cornell Univ. Press 1998). 
 14. See James G. Dwyer, Parents’ Religion and Children’s Welfare: Debunking the Doctrine of 
Parents’ Rights, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1371, 1406–11 (1994) (distinguishing the right to self-determination 
from the right to control others). 
 15. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 1426–46. Societal interests are sometimes invoked to justify other 
individual freedoms as well. For example, John Stuart Mill defended free speech in part on the grounds 
that a free marketplace of ideas is most conducive to progress toward truth. See JOHN STUART MILL, 
ON LIBERTY 59 (John Gray ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1991) (1859). But one proffering such an argument 
is unlikely to speak in terms of individual rights, rather than simply individual freedom, because it is 
incongruous with our understanding of the purpose of rights to say, “I should have this right because 
that would be good for others.” For arguments concerning corporal punishment and cultural diversity, 
see generally Alison Dundes Renteln, Corporal Punishment and the Cultural Defense, 73 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 253 (Spring 2010). 
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about the permissibility of male circumcision, the former lying in the area of 
education and the latter in the area of care of children’s bodies. 
Parents’ rights claims have been dominant in political and legal debates 
concerning regulation of religious schools, and they invoke all three moral 
bases—parents’ rights, children’s rights, and society’s interest in cultural 
diversity. Parents’ rights–based arguments against substantive restrictions on 
religious schooling rest on claims that according parents plenary rights to 
control children’s education (1) is best for children because parents are in the 
best position to make decisions about children’s schooling, given that parents 
care most about and know best their own children; (2) protects parents’ interest 
in exercising their religion and living by their own lights; and (3) serves society’s 
collective interest in cultural diversity.16 Parents’ rights–based claims are also 
prominent in arguments for continuing to permit parents to have their baby 
boys circumcised, against objections that this violates the boys’ basic right to 
bodily integrity, and they generally rest solely on parents’ interests—
predominantly, the interests of Jewish or Muslim parents in following the 
dictates of their religions and fathers’ interests in making their sons’ privates 
look like theirs.17 Parents’ rights–based arguments in the corporal-punishment 
context, in contrast, are, as noted above, secondary to a debate over the best 
way to raise children, and the arguments are generally limited to claims that 
according parents a right to spank is necessary to serve children’s welfare. 
Why these differences in the emphasis on and moral basis for assertions of 
parental entitlement? Looking more closely at what parents are seeking in each 
context suggests an answer. In the religious-school-regulation context, parents 
are effectively demanding the power to establish aims for their children’s 
development different from those the state has established for children 
generally. Parents and religious-school administrators do not typically maintain 
that state curricular regulations are based on faulty or inadequate empirical 
research or are poorly designed to ensure a good secular education for children. 
Rather, they assert that their first priority must be to ensure the spiritual 
welfare of their children by immersing them in an ideologically congenial 
environment, and they might even reject outright the aim of providing a secular 
education, at least in certain subjects such as science and history.18 As such, 
invocation of children’s rights or of children’s interests as a basis for the 
parents’ having rights are inapt in this context. Any court adjudicating the 
parent–state conflict could not itself conclude that the parents are correct about 
the content or relative importance of their children’s spiritual welfare because 
state actors in a liberal society are not supposed to make judgments about 
 
 16. See Dwyer, supra note 14, at 1426–46. 
 17. See, e.g., Joel Silverman, Circumcision: The Delicate Dilemma, THE JEWISH MONTHLY, Nov. 
1991, available at http://jewishcircumcision.org/thejmonthly1991.htm (quoting a rabbi as saying that 
“medical opinions have nothing to do with circumcision for Jews. We’re not talking about medical 
benefits. This is not a surgical procedure for us. This is the covenant between us and God.”). 
 18. See DWYER, supra note 13, at 17. 
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spiritual matters. At most, a court might conclude that letting the parents act on 
the basis of what they believe to be their children’s spiritual welfare will serve 
the parents’ interests in abiding by their religious faith. 
Arguments based on parental interests therefore have the most purchase in 
the religious-school-regulation context. Defenders of unregulated religious 
schooling do nevertheless sometimes contend that parental rights serve 
children’s welfare, and the contention has superficial appeal because in 
nonreligious contexts the assertion that parents know best is coherent, even if 
often empirically doubtful. They simply fail to acknowledge that a child-
welfare-based argument is incoherent in connection with an ideological contest 
over whether the state’s secular aims or the parents’ religious aims for child 
rearing should be controlling.19 
Arguments for parental rights of control over schooling that are based on 
cultural diversity, on the other hand, are coherent and superficially plausible. 
Eliminating certain forms of schooling could preclude formation of certain 
types of persons (for example, persons lacking awareness of any way of life 
other than that of their parents) and could result in extinction of some cultural 
communities or ways of life. However, the empirical hypothesis that there 
would be insufficient diversity of some sort as a result of imposing on all private 
schools academic standards or restrictions as to what students can be taught (for 
example, no aggressively sexist teaching) is ultimately quite implausible (is 
there not substantial diversity even among the ninety percent of Americans who 
graduate each year from public school?) and not readily susceptible to proof. 
Thus, arguments for a plenary parental right of control over private schooling 
gain only weak support from invocation of a societal interest in diversity. It is 
really parents’ interest in living according to their religious views that carries 
the moral weight in the religious-school-regulation context. 
In the corporal-punishment context, in contrast, parents are typically not 
asking to establish their own aims for children’s development and well-being. 
Parents who wish to spank do not assert in public debates that they want some 
sort of life for their children different from that of mainstream society—for 
example, a life of pain and fear.20 Nor do they assert an interest of their own in 
 
 19. One does sometimes see an argument for parental power over schooling that appeals more 
indirectly to children’s interest—namely, that independently of the quality of the schooling parents 
choose, children are adversely affected when the state makes their parents upset by thwarting the 
parents’ preferences. See, e.g., Michael S. Wald, Children’s Rights: A Framework for Analysis, 12 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 255, 280 (1979) (describing the claim that “[i]f we want to bolster the family, parents 
have to want to perform traditional functions, and they must be able to feel confident that they can 
perform these functions”). This line of reasoning is rarely prominent, however, because of the obvious 
moral-hazard concern that it raises—namely, that parents will fare better in public contests the more 
upset they appear to their children. 
 20. Underlying the practice of corporal punishment for some parents and religious-school officials 
is a belief that children should develop an attitude of submissiveness and humility of a sort or to a 
degree that differs from the mindset the state aims to instill. Underlying that belief is, in turn, a certain 
ideological view about the inherent nature of humanity and about the proper relationship between the 
individual and his or her god or the faith community. See DWYER, supra note 13, at 29. The expression 
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enjoying a way of life different from the mainstream, one that involves hitting 
children, nor a societal interest in having a diversity of lifestyles, some that 
involve hitting and some that do not. Such assertions would not garner much 
sympathy. Their position, even when they claim support for it in religious texts, 
is rather that their way of serving the shared aim of instilling proper self-
discipline in children is a good one.21 The disagreement is about means rather 
than ends. As such, arguments for parents’ rights to spank typically rest on 
children’s interests rather than parents’ interests or societal interests. 
Opponents of a ban on corporal punishment do sometimes invoke collective 
interests—namely, the societal need for future adults to be law-abiding22—but 
not often, and generally not to bolster a claim of parental entitlement. Thus, in 
the corporal-punishment context, parents assert a right to adopt their preferred 
means to an end shared with the rest of society (proper discipline of children), 
whereas in the religious-school-regulation context, parents assert a right to 
pursue different ends—ends that the state in a liberal society cannot itself 
adopt. And in the corporal-punishment context, the primary moral basis for 
parents’ rights is children’s welfare, whereas in the religious-school-regulation 
context it is parents’ interests, with societal interests playing a secondary role.  
The two differences together make sense. When the subject matter is some 
aspect of child rearing, when everyone agrees that the most important thing is 
to raise children properly, and when there is no disagreement about what 
outcome for children is sought, one would expect any parental demands to 
freedom of choice in the means to achieving that outcome to be couched in 
terms of children’s welfare. In contrast, when there is disagreement about the 
outcome to be sought, and for some the outcome is one that the state is 
categorically precluded from embracing (for example, eternal salvation), one 
 
“beat the devil out of them” captures this outlook. But one does not find such adults speaking in public 
debates regarding corporal punishment about beating the devil out of children, perhaps because they 
realize that there would be little public receptivity to an argument that parents are entitled to choose a 
life of submissiveness and self-abnegation for their children. 
 21. See, e.g., X, Y and Z, 5 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. at 154, 156–57 (rejecting the argument 
that applying Swedish law of assault to corporal punishment of children would violate parents’ rights to 
freedom of conscience and religion); Kliger, supra note 4 (quoting an expert on Islamic law who 
explained that it encourages parents to use corporal punishment only as necessary to instill discipline, 
and to guard against using it so much that the child becomes “displeased, inactive and lazy”). One 
possible interest of parents that might be at stake in any regulation of their child rearing is their self-
image as parents who always do what is best for their children, which might be threatened by a law 
prohibiting something they do. If that self-image is incorrect, though, because they in fact do one or 
more things that are not best for their children, it is not clear that they have an interest in maintaining 
that (false) self-image. 
 22. See, e.g., Lawrence Diller, The Truth About Spanking: Promoting a Ban is Counterproductive, 
NAT’L REV., April 21, 2008, available at http://nrd.nationalreview.com/article/ 
?q=M2JmZmU2MzY2YWZmMDI1OTY4YzhjNjM3NTRjYmYyMTI= (arguing that a decline in 
spanking has caused “a sixfold increase in criminal assaults . . . along with major increases in juvenile 
delinquency and substance abuse” in Sweden, and suggesting that it might also be the cause of “a wildly 
growing increase in the use of psychiatric drugs for childhood mental disorders”); Rich Mkhondo, 
Bring Back the Rod and Cane, STAR (South Africa), July 31, 2008, at 18 (arguing that anarchy in 
schools and violent crimes in society are a result of diminished use of corporal punishment). 
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would expect parental-entitlement claims to be couched in terms of satisfying 
the desires of parents and perhaps also in terms of toleration and diversity. 
It would not be difficult, though, to construct arguments for a parental right 
to spank that treat parents’ interests or societal interests as independent and 
sufficient justifications,23 so it is worth exploring why such arguments are rarely 
made. An argument based on parents’ interests could begin with an assumption 
that hitting children, relative to other means of disciplining them, can be easier, 
enable parents to relieve stress, or carry on a family tradition. An argument 
based on societal interests could begin with an assumption that crime is so 
costly that society benefits when parents use the disciplinary strategy most 
likely to prevent criminal conduct, so long as it does not cause substantial and 
permanent physical damage (because that would reduce productivity too 
much), coupled with a debatable empirical supposition that spanking is more 
likely to prevent criminal conduct than is any means of discipline that does not 
involve hitting. Such arguments, insofar as they treat interests of persons other 
than children as independent justification regardless of their coinciding with 
children’s interests, implicitly treat as acceptable sacrificing some welfare 
interest of children for the sake of serving others’ interests. It might be that 
people are generally uncomfortable making arguments that implicitly treat 
others instrumentally. Yet it could be said also of arguments for a parental right 
of control over schooling based on parental or societal interests that they 
implicitly treat children instrumentally.24  
So why are such arguments less common in the corporal-punishment realm? 
The answer to that question would appear to lie in the nature of hitting relative 
to indoctrinating. Hitting is conduct directed at the body, to which adults also 
feel vulnerable, that causes immediate and tangible suffering, and that is 
universally regarded as a wrong in all cases when it passes some threshold of 
severity. We generally view the body as more sacrosanct and more vulnerable 
than the mind. Because adults worry about being hit themselves, they are more 
sensitive to the harm that hitting can cause. The immediacy of suffering triggers 
a negative gut reaction, even in many parents who spank their children.25 And 
recognition that extreme hitting is wrong even with respect to children rules out 
the position that hitting is inherently unobjectionable. In contrast, 
indoctrination is aimed at the mind, which is viewed as inevitably subject to 
incursions from without, especially for children. It is not something adults worry 
about happening to themselves. Any harm it might cause is fairly amorphous 
and manifest only after a long period. And there is no consensus that 
 
 23. It is also possible to present plausible arguments that corporal punishment is bad for parents. 
See, e.g., Chick Moorman & Thomas Haller, Spanking: “This is Going to Hurt Me More than It Hurts 
You,” UNCOMMON PARENTING, http://www.uncommon-parenting.com/advice-articles/spanking-this-is-
going-to-hurt-me-more-than-it-hurts-you/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (describing how spanking leads 
children to disconnect from their parents and causes parents to lose stature in their children’s eyes). 
 24. See DWYER, supra note 13, at 81. 
 25. See e.g., PAUL KROPP, I’LL BE THE PARENT, YOU BE THE KID: THE HOT BUTTON TOPICS IN 
PARENTING 95 (Random House Can. 1998) (1991). 
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indoctrination can be so extreme as to warrant state interference; many people 
are comfortable even with what they view as the most reclusive and 
indoctrinatory of child-rearing environments, such as religious cults, unless the 
reclusiveness serves to shield physical or sexual abuse from public awareness. 
These distinctions, on the whole, appear to make people believe greater 
justification is needed for hitting than for indoctrination, and serving the 
interests of persons other than the ones who are being hit is inherently weaker 
as a justification than is serving the interests of the persons who are being hit. 
The interests of other persons at stake would need to be very great and not able 
to be served in some other way. Stated in terms akin to constitutional-rights 
adjudication, a right not to be hit is widely recognized as a fundamental moral 
right, infringement of which is justifiable only when the least restrictive means 
are used to serve a legitimate and compelling interest. In contrast, not much 
consideration is given to the notion of a right not to be indoctrinated,26 and it 
might be that most people would not put it on the list of fundamental rights—
because there is nothing inherently bad about having some set of moral beliefs 
or because some amount of exogenous belief formation is inevitable for 
humans. Indeed many defenders of parental entitlement with respect to 
children’s ideological formation characterize the issue as whether a parent or 
the state is going to indoctrinate the child.27 If there is only some weaker form of 
moral right against being indoctrinated, lesser justification would be needed to 
infringe the right, and serving the interests of other persons might suffice in 
some cases, especially when the indoctrination is of a fairly moderate form, as is 
true of most religious schools. 
In sum, the best explanation for the greater prominence of parents’ rights 
claims and for the appeal to the interests of parents and society in supporting 
those claims in the religious-school-regulation context would appear to be that 
this context involves parental objections to aims for child rearing, not simply to 
means of achieving shared aims, making appeal to children’s interests inapt. 
The religious-school-regulation context involves indoctrination, which might 
appear not to infringe any fundamental right and therefore not require 
especially compelling justification, so justifications based on interests of persons 
other than children can appear sufficient to many people. Corporal punishment, 
in contrast,  involves hitting, which requires more compelling justification, and 
showing that it is actually beneficial to the persons whose prima facie right not 
to be hit is being infringed is the most compelling justification one could offer. 
 
 26. Significantly, constitutional challenges to religious instruction and symbols in public schools, 
and challenges to state funding of religious schools, have always invoked the Establishment Clause 
rather than First or Fourteenth Amendment rights of school children. See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 648–49 (2002) (analyzing an Ohio school-choice program under the Establishment 
Clause). 
 27. See, e.g., Cathleen A. Cleaver & Greg Erken, Parental Rights: Who Decides How Children Are 
Raised?, 9 FAM. POL’Y 1, 4 (1996); Stephen G. Gilles, Review Essay: Hey, Christians, Leave Your Kids 
Alone! Religious Schools v. Children’s Rights, 16 CONST. COMMENT. 149, 184 (1999) (stating that 
children in public schools tend to become “conformists, hedonists, even nihilists”). 
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The focus of debate is thus on the costs and benefits of spanking for children, to 
which claims of parental entitlement are largely superfluous. As discussed 
further below, if defenders of spanking could demonstrate empirically that 
spanking is necessary for the proper upbringing of children, that should be 
enough to make the case for its permissibility, especially in an environment like 
that prevailing in the United States—that is, one in which it is currently legally 
permitted and widely condoned. 
Circumcision shares some features with religious schooling and some with 
corporal punishment. It is like religious schooling insofar as most parents 
choose it for cultural or ideological reasons, if they in fact consciously choose it 
(in the United States, many parents sign consent forms simply because the 
practice is taken for granted here),28 so to some extent parents’ choices reflect 
aims different from those of the state in connection with how medical 
professionals treat babies’ bodies.29 Many Jews and Muslims want to circumcise 
their sons in large part because they believe this is necessary in order to 
conform to the dictates of their religion.30 Other parents choose circumcision for 
nonreligious but cultural reasons, such as pressure from grandparents and 
friends who chose it for their sons or from fathers’ wanting their sons to look 
like them in this respect.31 The state cannot constitutionally endorse keeping 
faith with God as an aim of child rearing, and it generally does not base 
regulations concerning medical treatment of children on cultural considerations. 
Nonetheless, states across the globe have long permitted circumcision of 
boys (though most now prohibit comparable procedures on girls). In the United 
States, most states in fact subsidize the practice through their Medicaid 
programs.32 This is not because of legislative findings that circumcision is good 
for boys’ health. The medical community has debated the health benefits and 
 
 28. See PAUL M. FLEISS & FREDERICK M. HODGES, WHAT YOUR DOCTOR MAY NOT TELL YOU 
ABOUT CIRCUMCISION: UNTOLD FACTS ON AMERICA’S MOST WIDELY PERFORMED—AND MOST 
UNNECESSARY—SURGERY 139 (Warner Books 2002); George W. Kaplan, Circumcision: An 
Overview, 7 CURRENT PROBS. PEDIATRICS 1, 14–15 (1977) (advocating informed consent by parents 
and describing the hurried treatment that consent forms receive on the mother’s way to the delivery 
room). 
 29. Cf. Arleen A. Leibowitz, Katherine Desmond & Thomas Belin, Determinants and Policy 
Implications of Male Circumcision in the United States, 99 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 138, 138 (2009) (noting 
that Medicaid programs in sixteen states do not cover circumcision). 
 30. Increasingly, there is disagreement among Jews as to the dictates of Jewish law with respect to 
circumcision and as to its appropriateness, given the findings of medical science about the practice. See, 
e.g., THE COVENANT OF CIRCUMCISION: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON AN ANCIENT JEWISH RITE 
(Elizabeth Wyner Mark ed., Brandeis Univ. Press 2003); Melissa King, Why Circumcise?, STAR TRIB. 
(Minneapolis, Minn.), Aug. 16, 2006, at 1E; Silverman, supra note 17. 
 31. See, e.g., Silverman, supra note 17; Tom Scheve, How Circumcision Works, http:// 
health.howstuffworks.com/circumcision5.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 32. See Amber Craig & Dan Bollinger, Of Waste and Want: A Nationwide Survey of Medicaid 
Funding for Medically Unnecessary, Non-therapeutic Circumcision, in BODILY INTEGRITY AND THE 
POLITICS OF CIRCUMCISION: CULTURE, CONTROVERSY, AND CHANGE 233, 235 (George C. 
Denniston et al. eds., Springer 2006). 
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costs of circumcision,33 but this debate has not much affected popular thinking 
or legislative discussion about the subject. The facts that no government on 
earth mandates circumcision and that a substantial number of U.S. states have 
ceased Medicaid funding for circumcision in recent years suggests that the 
science does not support an argument that boys need to be circumcised for 
health reasons. Indeed, major medical organizations have taken the position 
that parents should not have their baby boys circumcised absent a physical 
abnormality creating a medical necessity.34 One child-welfare reason many 
parents in the United States have had for circumcising is that they do not want 
their sons to appear abnormal in the school locker room,35 but that concern has 
never had much currency in other western nations (where circumcision has 
largely been limited to Jews and Muslims) and has little currency in the United 
States today, both because communal showering is now fairly uncommon in 
schools and because half of boys in the United States are uncircumcised 
(indeed, in some parts of the country, where the circumcision rate is well below 
fifty percent, this concern points in the opposite direction).36 And the concern 
would, of course, be eliminated immediately by a law prohibiting circumcision. 
So circumcision is like unregulated religious schooling in that the state permits 
it without having a clear child-welfare justification for doing so, and defenses of 
the practice tend to involve parents’ rights claims that rest on parents’ interests 
rather than on children’s interests. 
On the other hand, circumcision is like corporal punishment insofar as it 
entails an incursion on bodily integrity, indeed one much more severe than 
spanking. As such, both trigger objections that the practice violates basic human 
rights of children.37 And, like corporal punishment, surgical alteration of boys’ 
 
 33. For summaries of some of the medical debates, see FLEISS & HODGES, supra note 28; W.D. 
Dunsmuir & E.M. Gordon, The History of Circumcision, 83 BRIT. J. UROLOGY 1 passim (1999). 
 34. See Circumcision Resource Center, Position Statements of Medical Societies in English-
Speaking Countries, http://www.circumcision.org/position.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 35. See Circumcision Resource Center, Circumcision to Look Like Others, http:// 
www.circumcision.org/ others.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 36. See Dan Bollinger, Normal Versus Circumcised: U.S. Neonatal Male Incidence Ratio, 
http://www.cirp.org/library/statistics/bollinger2004/ (last visited Jan. 20, 2010); Dan Bollinger, Normal 
Versus Circumcised: U.S. Neonatal Male Genital Ratio, http://www.cirp.org/library/statistics/ 
bollinger2003/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); Circumcision Information and Resource Pages, United States 
Circumcision Incidence, http:// www.cirp.org/library/statistics/USA/ (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); 
International Coalition for Genital Integrity, Medicaid Defunding of Non-therapeutic Infant 
Circumcision, http://www.icgi.org/Medicaid_Project/index.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); see also Roni 
Caryn Rabin, Steep Drop Seen in Circumcisions in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2010, at D6. 
 37. See, e.g., Marilyn Fayre Milos & Donna Macris, Circumcision: A Medical or a Human Rights 
Issue?, 37 J. NURSE-MIDWIFERY 87S, 89S (1992); James W. Prescott, Marilyn Fayre Milos & George C. 
Denniston, Circumcision: Human Rights and Ethical Medical Practice, 59 HUMANIST, 45, 45–46 (1999); 
Doctors Opposing Circumcision, Human Rights Report: International Human Rights Law and the 
Circumcision of Children, http://www.doctorsopposingcircumcision.org/info/info-humanrights2006.html 
(last visited Oct. 20, 2009); Paul Mason, Male Circumcision & Human Rights, CIRCUMCISION AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS, http:// www.circumstitions.com/Rights.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2009); J. Steven 
Svoboda, Infant Male Circumcision: Examining the Human Rights and Constitutional Issues, NAT’L 
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penises is a practice that obviously can go too far—that is, everyone would 
grant there is some threshold beyond which the conduct is too severe and 
abusive. There is a common way of circumcising that people generally view as 
not extreme, but there are less- and more-intrusive things one could do to a 
penis for purposes of carrying on a tradition or making a boy’s penis look like 
his father’s.38 Consistent with the view offered above that people generally feel 
that much greater justification is needed for infringement of rights to bodily 
integrity and that the best justification one can offer is one tied to the interests 
of the person whose bodily integrity is being violated, one would expect 
defenders of circumcision to focus just on supposed medical benefits of 
circumcision for males. But they also invoke parental rights to a substantial 
degree and tend to base the parental-rights claims on parental interests rather 
than on children’s interests. Why is that? 
The best explanation might be that the medical case for circumcision is less 
convincing to people than is the behavioral case for corporal punishment. As is 
true with leaving religious schools free of academic regulations, when a clear 
child-welfare justification is lacking for the state, defenders of a practice in 
political discourse are more likely to rely on parents’ rights and parents’ 
interests and to maintain simply that opponents of the practice have not made a 
compelling child-welfare case for restricting parents. But why is it that the child-
welfare case for circumcision is less convincing than the child-welfare case for 
corporal punishment? In both realms, plausible empirical claims support both 
sides and some scientific studies support parental permission, but the weight of 
evidence points toward banning the practice, as evidenced by the fact that 
major health organizations have taken positions against it.39 The two issues thus 
cannot be distinguished on the basis of the strength of the child-welfare 
arguments for or against. 
In addition, with both circumcision and corporal punishment, there is a 
history of denying any injury to children. One widespread but clearly false 
belief is that newborns cannot feel pain or that any pain they experience is 
short-lived and alleviated by anesthetics.40 In addition, religiously infused 
attitudes toward sexuality have made it difficult for people to recognize loss of 
penile sensitivity as a harm. Likewise, there has been little recognition that 
corporal punishment could inflict any harm beyond the momentary sting of the 
spanking (unless it crosses the amorphous boundary between abuse and non-
 
ORG. TO HALF THE ABUSE AND ROUTINE MUTILATION OF MALES, http://www.noharmm.org/ 
svoboda.htm (last visited Oct. 20, 2009). 
 38. See YUKI’S INTACTIVISM RESOURCES, http://www.angelfire.com/ca5/intact/fgm.html (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2009) (“There are different types of MGM ranging from minor to severe; they include 
genital piercing, circumcision, subincision, and castration.”). 
 39. See supra text accompanying notes 33 and 34. 
 40. See, e.g., Alan Greene, No Excuse for Circumcision Pain!, DR. GREENE, http:// 
www.drgreene.org/ body.cfm?id=21&action=detail&ref=759 (last visited Oct. 20, 2009) (citing evidence 
that newborns circumcised without anesthesia “experience true pain accompanied by increased blood 
pressure, increased heart rate, decreased oxygen in the blood, and a surge of stress hormones”). 
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abuse), and the great majority of people who were spanked themselves are 
inclined to deny that their parents harmed them in the process. The denial of 
harm has become more difficult to maintain in both realms; the sexual 
revolution of the 1960s and studies of human sexuality have made it more 
difficult to deny that lost penile sensitivity is a harm,41 and the elevation of 
children’s social status and the explosion of research on children’s psychological 
health in recent decades has forced people to recognize that there can be a 
psychological impact from spanking and that any such impact matters morally. 
But the denial persists with respect to both practices. 
Thus, as to both circumcision and corporal punishment, empirical evidence 
is somewhat ambiguous and resistance to acknowledging any harm to children 
is pervasive. Some alternative explanation is needed for the greater 
persuasiveness of child-welfare justifications for corporal punishment. One 
possibility is that when empirical evidence does not point uniformly in one 
direction, people are more willing to rely on homespun wisdom respecting 
children’s moral and psychological development than they are respecting 
children’s physical health.42 We recognize our personal ignorance when it comes 
to medicine, and probably most people who do wade into the empirical debate 
about circumcision’s health costs and benefits quickly begin to feel lost, whereas 
there is a widespread belief in nonprofessional expertise when it comes to 
discipline. Repeatedly, one finds resistance to a ban on corporal punishment 
expressed in terms of supposed general wisdom and on personal experience 
(that is, “I was whooped, and it did me good.”).43 
Another possibility is that the universality of corporal punishment—that is, 
the fact that in nearly all nations of the globe, corporal punishment of children 
has been the norm—lends credence to the homespun wisdom.44 We gain much 
confidence in our inherited beliefs about child rearing from knowing that most 
of the world shares the beliefs, and we are naturally reluctant to conclude that 
the entire human race has been doing something bad to children for a very long 
time. In contrast, circumcision has never been a routine practice in most 
western countries (in Europe, the vast majority of men are uncircumcised), and 
in the United States, nonreligious circumcision became the norm only in the 
mid-nineteenth century and has waned considerably in popularity in recent 
decades.45 The much lower incidence of circumcision undermines any suggestion 
that baby boys need it. It seems plausible to claim that a parent has a duty to 
 
 41. See, e.g., Gregory J. Boyle et al., Male Circumcision: Pain, Trauma and Psychosexual Sequelae, 
7 J. HEALTH PSYCHOL. 329, 334 (2002) (describing structural and functional consequences of 
circumcision). 
 42. See Gershoff & Bitensky, supra note 3, at 258 (noting the tendency of nonexpert participants in 
local policy debates about school corporal punishment toward “reliance on personal experience over 
empirical data”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. See EUR. PARL. ASS., Report: Europe-wide Ban on Corporal Punishment of Children, 23d 
Sitting, Doc. No. 10199 (2004). 
 45. Rabin, supra note 36. 
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spank a misbehaving child for the child’s own good, but not to claim that a 
parent has a duty to circumcise a child. No objective observer would accuse the 
half of American parents who do not circumcise their boys of being neglectful 
parents, whereas it is not uncommon to hear blame directed at parents of 
unruly children for not giving them a good spanking. Many people believe that 
sparing the rod will produce a generation of spoiled children, but there is no 
social perception that the diminishing rate of circumcision in the United States 
or the always-low rate of circumcision in Europe creates a public-health 
problem. 
In sum, parents’ rights claims are less prominent with respect to corporal 
punishment than they are with respect to circumcision and are more likely to 
rest on assertions about what children need than on suggestions that the state 
should permit parents to gratify their desires, even though both corporal 
punishment and circumcision entail violations of bodily integrity and therefore 
require strong justification. And the reason for the difference between these 
two cases appears to be that people find the child-welfare justifications for 
corporal punishment more convincing than those for circumcision, even though 
in both cases the weight of scientific evidence appears to be against those 
supposed justifications (as evidenced by opposition to both from major 
professional organizations). This, in turn, might be because the justifications for 
corporal punishment appeal to homespun wisdom and personal experience 
rather than to complex studies in the physical sciences, and the universality of 
the practice gives the homespun wisdom greater credibility. 
Contrasting corporal punishment with religious schooling and with 
circumcision thus reveals a possible explanation for why parents’ rights claims 
play a lesser role in public and political discourse concerning corporal 
punishment. In an era when the legal system and society recognize children as 
persons with legal and moral rights of their own, the best defense of any child-
rearing practice that some parents wish to use is that it is actually good for 
children in a way that the state and the majority of people can recognize. 
Arguments against any substantive regulation of religious schooling cannot 
invoke the “for their own good” defense because the conclusion its proponents 
seek is that parents should be able to define the good for their children in a way 
that the state cannot and that the majority does not recognize. So they must 
appeal instead to the interests of parents; and to impute gravity to those 
interests, they attribute to parents an entitlement to satisfaction of the interests. 
In connection with children’s mental development, appealing to the interests of 
persons other than the children (that is, parents) seems both less offensive and 
sufficient to justify the claimed right, at least insofar as they are a kind of 
interest (compliance with religious commands) that receives independent 
constitutional protection. Thus, parents’ rights claims are much more prominent 
in connection with opposition to state regulation of religious schools. 
Arguments for the continued permissibility of circumcision, in contrast, can 
invoke a child-welfare defense of the practice that is facially plausible, so 
parents’ rights claims are somewhat less prominent than in the religious-school-
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regulation context. However, that defense is less convincing to people than is a 
child-welfare defense of corporal punishment, so defenders of circumcision are 
more likely to appeal also to parents’ rights and to base that appeal on parents’ 
own interests. Yet parents’ own interests are not likely to appear as sufficient 
justification respecting a practice entailing severe incursion on children’s bodily 
integrity. The weakness of both child-welfare and parental-interest justifications 
for circumcision helps explain why the practice has diminished considerably in 
the United States in recent decades. 
The lesson for the corporal-punishment debate is therefore this: Parents’ 
rights claims are not especially prominent or adamant in that debate because 
people generally understand that an incursion on bodily integrity requires 
strong justification; people are increasingly inclined to concede that this is true 
of children as well as of adults; and the best and perhaps only sufficient 
justification is that the incursion is on the whole beneficial for the person. Most 
people feel confident in the child-welfare justifications for corporal punishment 
because there are some studies to support them and, perhaps more importantly, 
the universality and pervasiveness of the practice bolster the homespun wisdom 
that at least some children need to be spanked sometimes to instill proper 
discipline. So long as the child-welfare justification maintains its appeal, 
parents’ rights claims are superfluous, and to the extent anyone advances them, 
they are likely to appeal to children’s interests as the moral basis for the right. 
Thus, the focus of debate has been and will remain whether spanking is on the 
whole beneficial or harmful to children. 
III 
PARENTAL CHILD-REARING RIGHTS AS CONCEPTUAL ERROR 
As noted in part I, we generally view rights as protections of the right-
holder’s own choices and interests. It is odd to justify one person’s having a 
right in terms of another person’s interests. Why not say that it is the other 
person who possesses the right? Yet in the child-rearing realm, it is very 
common to speak of parental entitlement, even when the supposed justification 
for the entitlement is children’s welfare. In the United States, it is fairly rare to 
speak of any parenting practice as a matter of children’s entitlement, even when 
the argument is that a practice is good for or even necessary for children. Other 
western countries are much more comfortable in speaking of children’s rights in 
connection with their upbringing,46 but even there, defenses of corporal 
punishment rarely mention children’s having a right to it. 
Opponents of corporal punishment might therefore make some headway by 
pushing the point that speaking of parents’ rights as a protection of children’s 
 
 46. The Family Code of the Russian Federation, for example, contains an entire chapter entitled 
“Rights of Minor Children,” as well as a chapter entitled “Rights and Duties of Parents.” See RUSSIAN 
FAMILY LAW: THE FAMILY CODE OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION AND FEDERAL LAW ON ACTS OF 
CIVIL STATUS 30, 35 (William E. Butler ed. & trans., Simmonds & Hill Publishers 1998). 
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interests is anomalous and conceptually incoherent and by insisting that any 
talk of rights resting only on children’s interests be in terms of children’s rights 
rather than parents’ rights. They should seek to inject greater conceptual clarity 
into normative discussions by demanding that proponents of corporal 
punishment, if they truly believe that children need it for their proper 
development, should be willing to assert and defend the proposition that 
children have a right to be spanked, and that if proponents of corporal 
punishment ever invoke parental rights they should be prepared to identify 
parental interests that the rights would protect and to explain why those 
interests of parents are sufficient to justify licensing parents to hit their children. 
Of course, it is not necessary in order for a child-rearing practice to be 
legally permitted that we can coherently and convincingly assert that children 
need it. Permitting can entail simply not prohibiting, and there are many 
innocuous or modestly beneficial or modestly harmful parenting practices that 
the state does not have sufficient reason to require or prohibit. But if some form 
of treatment is truly necessary for a child’s well-being, then the state is likely to 
mandate it, and it would be natural to speak of such a mandate as reflecting a 
right of the child. Some state codes, for example, characterize education as a 
right of children. Thus, anyone who takes the strong empirical stance that 
corporal punishment is necessary for children’s well-being—that is, that there is 
no alternative way to instill proper discipline—should be prepared to say that 
children have a right to it. Yet anyone is likely to feel a visceral resistance to 
pronouncing that some person has a right to be hit, and that resistance might 
cause defenders of spanking to back down from that strong empirical stance. If 
they do so, and adopt the more modest position that spanking is just an 
effective tool, they can be pushed to explain why parents should not be required 
to adopt alternative means that do not involve hitting. 
In addition, forcing proponents of corporal punishment to speak of parental 
rights only if they can identify interests of parents that support such an 
entitlement should make talk of parental rights in this context disappear. 
Because the practice at issue involves a physical attack and because religious 
motivation is really not a salient aspect of spanking, no parental interest is likely 
to appear strong enough to support the rights claim, and some might be no 
different from the interests people have in other contexts in striking other 
persons. An interest in carrying on a spanking tradition is a weak one. Interests 
in venting frustration47 or in avoiding the loss of time involved in alternative 
ways of changing children’s behavior are not interests unique to parenting; 
hitting other adults could also be a way of alleviating frustrations and a more 
expedient way of altering their behavior. The strongest argument based on 
parental interests might be one based on parents’ interest in avoiding moral or 
legal responsibility for harms their children cause third parties. We impose a 
 
 47. See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 4 (quoting a cofounder of mumsnet.com as saying most mothers 
on the site “admit they’ve done it once or twice in anger but feel awful about it”). 
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duty on parents to supervise their children and to prevent them from harming 
others, and third parties can seek damages against parents for their children’s 
intentional torts.48 But that interest is not really unique; employers can be liable 
for their employees’ torts and so have an interest in deterring their wrongdoing 
that might be served by whipping them. And it would support the entitlement 
only as far as the interest extends, which might mean only in situations in which 
a child appears likely to harm third parties. 
Another type of interest often attributed to parents is one simply in 
dominion over their children, in controlling their children’s lives. This sort of 
interest, though, is simply an illegitimate one, not one that can ground a right. 
Rights in our legal and moral culture are protections of self-determination and 
self-regarding interests, never protections of anyone’s desire to control the life 
of another per se. Even if the interest is characterized more charitably as one in 
satisfying a desire that one’s child’s life goes well, it is still not the sort of 
interest that can ground an entitlement. This is readily perceived in other 
contexts in which one person might very altruistically wish that another person’s 
life go better, such as pro-life activists who truly care about the spiritual and 
psychological welfare of pregnant women contemplating abortion; their concern 
cannot give rise to any entitlement on their part to have a say in the abortion 
decision and certainly not to inflict punishment on women who choose to abort. 
Even when the adult whose life someone wants to control is nonautonomous, 
satisfying the altruistic desire to ensure that the nonautonomous person’s life 
goes well is not an interest that popular morality or law treats as a basis for 
attributing a right; custodians of incompetent adults are afforded some freedom 
and power to act in the best interests of their wards, but they are viewed as 
having that freedom and power as a matter of privilege, not entitlement. To 
view it as a matter of entitlement would appear to treat the nonautonomous 
adult instrumentally, as a means to gratifying the caretaker, and we reject such 
instrumental treatment of persons. We should do the same when the 
nonautonomous persons involved are children. 
Thus, a proper understanding of rights and greater care in tying rights to 
interests of the supposed right-holder should result in elimination of parents’ 
rights talk from public discourse about corporal punishment and greater 
attention to the specific content of children’s rights, if in fact they have any at 
stake. Defenders of corporal punishment should be asked to clarify whether 
they believe children have a right to be spanked. If not—that is, if they abjure 
the position that children need corporal punishment, such that parents who fail 
to use it are violating a duty they owe to their children—then they should be 
 
 48. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STATS. § 52-572 (2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-2-3 (2006); TENN. CODE 
ANN. §§ 37-10-101–37-10-103 (2005); Henneberry v. Simoneaux, No. M2005-02032-COA-R3-CV, 2006 
WL 2450138 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 22, 2006) (holding that parental liability does not extend to negligent 
acts of their children); Hun Yin Fa, supra note 11, at art. 23 (“If children who are minors cause damage 
to the state, the collective, or individuals, their parents shall have the duty to bear civil liability.”); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 316 (1965). 
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asked to clarify whether they believe children possess at least a presumptive 
right not to be hit (if not an absolute right). If they maintain that children do 
not have that right, they should be required to explain why not, given the 
attribution of such a right (or an even stronger right—that is, an absolute right) 
to all other persons. If they concede that children do have that presumptive 
right, they should be asked to articulate what sort of showing is necessary to 
override that right not to be hit, or in other words, what can justify an 
infringement of the right. Debate could then focus just on this normative 
question of what empirical showing as to children’s interests is required to 
override their right not to be hit and then on the empirical question of whether 
that showing has been made. If a parental right to spank and children’s right to 
be spanked are both eliminated from the equation, and if a presumptive right 
not to be hit is attributed to children, then the burden of proof would lie 
squarely on the defenders of corporal punishment and any ambiguity in the 
scientific literature would therefore have to count in favor of banning the 
practice. 
For their part, opponents of corporal punishment can pursue at least two 
lines of argument. One, which has perhaps received insufficient attention, is to 
argue that children have an absolute right not to be hit, so that even if corporal 
punishment were on the whole best for children in terms of their healthy or 
proper development, it is still impermissible, perhaps because some dignitary 
harm overrides welfare concerns (as appears to be assumed with respect to 
hitting adults). The second, more-common approach is to first establish that 
children have at least a presumptive right not to be hit, which is easily done, and 
then to argue that no considerations override that presumption. That latter 
argument must refute parental rights claims, but I have explained why that, too, 
is easily done, and more readily so by pushing the conceptual points I made 
above. This focuses the debate on child-welfare justifications, with the burden 
of proof on defenders of corporal punishment. However, opponents should 
articulate and defend a particular test for meeting that burden (for example, 
must defenders show it is absolutely necessary for proper development or just 
that it is on the whole good for some children?) and should also squarely 
address and explain the universality of hitting as a method of child rearing (how 
can it be wrong if it has been so common in so many cultures for so long?). 
IV 
CONCLUSION 
Claims of parental entitlement have had some currency in public discourse 
concerning corporal punishment, but not as much as they have had in some 
other child-rearing contexts, such as regulation of religious schooling and infant 
male circumcision. The simple explanation for the relatively small role of such 
claims in discussion of corporal punishment is that they are largely superfluous. 
They appear plausible only insofar as they rest on concerns about children’s 
well-being, and such concerns can be addressed directly, invoking children’s 
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rights or invoking no rights at all. But parents’ rights talk can create a 
distraction and muddy the waters, so the discourse could be improved by 
eliminating such talk. A better understanding of the nature of rights among 
participants in the debate, and of the clarity gained by tying rights to the 
persons whose interests are properly at stake, should lead them to banish 
parents’ rights from the normative landscape. If anyone has rights at stake, it is 
children, and discussion should focus on the specific content of those rights and 
how much discretion or freedom they leave for parents to discipline their 
children. 
 
